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The human brain exhibits fundamental limitations in
multitasking. When subjects engage in a primary
task, their ability to respond to a second stimulus is
degraded. Two competing models of multitasking
have been proposed: either cognitive resources
are shared between tasks, or they are allocated to
each task serially. Using a novel combination of
magneto-encephalography and multivariate pattern
analyses, we obtained a precise spatio-temporal
decomposition of the brain processes at work during
multitasking. We discovered that each task relies on
a sequence of brain processes. These sequences
can operate in parallel for several hundred millisec-
onds but beyond 500 ms, they repel each other:
processes evoked by the first task are shortened,
while processes of the second task are either length-
ened or postponed. These results contradict the
resource-sharing model and further demonstrate
that the serial model is incomplete. We therefore pro-
pose a new theoretical framework for the computa-
tional architecture underlying multitasking.
INTRODUCTION
However alert we may be, we can hardly focus onmore than one
task at any one time. The process by which the human brain se-
lects relevant information from the environment has fundamental
temporal constraints, dramatically illustrated in dual-task set-
tings: when subjects focus on a task, this engagement impairs
their ability to initiate the motor response to another stimulus
(the psychological refractory period) (Pashler, 1994) or even to
detect it (the attentional blink) (Raymond et al., 1992). Current
models of dual-task interference agree that (1) performing a
task involves at least three stages (sensory, central decision,
and motor processing; Figure 1A), (2) sensory and motor stages
can operate in parallel with other operations, but (3) the central
stage has limited capacities. A key point of disagreement be-
tween models regards the central stage: the serial bottleneck
model hypothesizes that the central stage is serial; that is, itNeprocesses only one task at a time (Pashler, 1994; Sigman and
Dehaene, 2005) (Figure 1B). By contrast, the resource-sharing
model proposes that the central stage canprocessmultiple tasks
in parallel but possesses limited resources that therefore have to
be shared between tasks (Kahneman, 1973; Tombu and Joli-
coeur, 2003). As the delay between tasks 1 and 2 shortens, the
period during which resources are shared increases, therefore
slowing down both tasks’ processing (Figure 1C).
To understand how the human brain handles multi-task situa-
tions, we investigated three critical predictions that disentangle
the resource sharing and the serial bottleneck models. First,
the resource-sharing model suggests that Task 1 processing is
prolonged during dual tasking, while the bottleneck model pre-
dicts that it remains unchanged. Second, resource-sharing
models propose that the central stages of Task 1 and 2 are per-
formed in parallel, while bottleneckmodels propose that they are
performed one after the other. Third, if capacities are shared, the
amplitude of brain activations associated with central stages
should decrease for both tasks during task overlap. By contrast,
according to the bottleneck model, activation amplitude for the
task that is currently processed should be similar within or
outside the interference period.
Testing these predictions is challenging as it requires simulta-
neouslymonitoring, at thewhole-brain level, eachof the cognitive
processing stages of the two tasks, fromstimulus presentation to
motor response. Recent developments in magnetoencephalog-
raphy (MEG) combined with multivariate pattern analysis
(MVPA) may provide a first approximation of this ideal recording
setup, by isolating and tracking within each subject the neural
patterns specific to eachprocessing stage.MVPAcanbeapplied
to MEG signals by fitting a different classifier on every time sam-
ple separately (Figure 1D). The resulting time course reveals
whether two experimental conditions can be separated based
on the succession of brain responses they elicit and how this in-
formation evolves across time. An important aspect of this tech-
nique is that each classifier trained at time t (thereafter referred to
as ‘‘training time’’) can also be tested on its ability to discriminate
conditions at other time points t’ (‘‘testing time’’). Such temporal
generalization (Figure 1D) is a good way to reveal the onset and
the duration of a given pattern of brain activity, and how it varies
with experimental conditions (King andDehaene, 2014). Here,we
apply this tool to the decomposition of dual-task processes. We
first identify a series of classifiers that decode the successive
steps of each task outside the interference period (i.e., at a longuron 88, 1297–1307, December 16, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1297
Figure 1. Resource-Sharing and Bottleneck Models of Dual-Task Interference
(A) Schematic representations of non-conflicting tasks. Task 1 (blue) and Task 2 (red) are divided in sensory (S), central (C), and motor stages (M).
(B) Serial bottleneck model: the central stage dedicates its full resources to one task at a time and thus performs them one after the other.
(C) Resource-sharing model: tasks are performed in parallel but with reduced effectiveness.
(D) Schematic representation of the decoding analyses. The brain activity is recorded using MEG while subjects perform a dual task. Each task induces a
sequence of patterns of brain activity from the stimulus onset to the motor response, here schematized by three hypothetical stages, S, C, and M. At each time
(legend continued on next page)
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inter-target lag). We then apply the same classifiers to experi-
mental recordings obtained while the same tasks were executed
during the interference period. In this way, we discover which
brain processes are selectively shortened, delayed, reduced, or
abolished during dual tasking.
RESULTS
We applied this method to MEG recordings from a previously
published dual-task experiment (Marti et al., 2012) aimed at
investigating the neural mechanisms common to the attentional
blink and to the psychological refractory period. During the main
dual-task runs, ten subjects had to discriminate, as fast as
possible, one of two target sounds (Task 1), and then one of
two target letters (Task 2) embedded in a series of random letters
(10/s, see Figure 2A). The sound (T1) was separated from the
target letter (T2) by 1, 2, 4, or 9 letters, thereafter called ‘‘Lags
1, 2, 4, and 9,’’ respectively, where each lag lasts for 100 ms.
In a fifth condition, T2 was replaced by a distractor letter (‘‘Dis-
tractor letter’’ condition). Finally, participants performed a sepa-
rate control condition, during which they were instructed to
ignore the sound (‘‘Irrelevant sound’’ condition) (details about
stimuli and experimental procedures can be found in the Supple-
mental Information). All analyses were performed on trials in
which the response to the auditory T1 was first and accurate
(>95% of the trials). Hence, RT1 always refers to the response
time to the auditory task and RT2 always refers to the response
time to the visual task.
Measures of reaction times ondual-task runs revealed a typical
refractory period (Figure 2B): RT2 increased from737ms at Lag 9
to 957 ms at Lag 1 (F(3,27) = 31.70, p < 0.001), while RT1 re-
mained unaffected (621 ms and 622 ms for Lag 9 and Lag 1,
respectively). Subjects’ response accuracy also revealed an
Attentional Blink (Figure 2B). Themeanproportion of unseen trials
increased with decreasing Lag (Lag 9: 21.42%; Lag 1: 37.04%,
F(3,27) = 15.82, p < 0.001) and was larger for slow than for fast
RT1 (main effect of RT1 speed based on a median split:
F(3,27) = 53.16, p < 0.001; Lag 3 RT1 speed interaction:
F(3,27) = 3.18, p=0.04). Thosefindings replicate previous studies
showing that the time spent to process Task 1 influences both the
attentional blink and the psychological refractory period, hence
suggesting that these two phenomena are closely related (Joli-
coeur, 1998, 1999a, 1999b). Nosuch lag effects onT2processing
wereobserved in thecontrol runswhere the soundwas irrelevant,
indicating that the Task 1, rather than the sound itself, was
responsible for the interference onto Task 2.
MEG recordings at Lag 9 revealed two distinct processing
chains for the two tasks. Figure 2A presents the average source
activity at specific time points as well as the time course of activ-
ity measured in three regions of interests located in the primary
auditory cortex, the primary visual cortex, and the primary motor
cortex (see Experimental Procedures). The auditory cortex was
activated by the presentation of the sound 100 ms after stim-sample, a classifier is trained to separate the conditions of interest. Each classifi
dynamics of the successive patterns of brain activity. The classifiers trained at a l
target lag conditions. The effects of lag on the dynamics of the sequence of bra
models.
Neulus onset. The comparison Relevant versus Irrelevant sounds,
aiming at isolating Task 1 processes, revealed activationsmainly
in the parietal cortex from 200 to 600 ms (Figure 2C). The visual
task-elicited activity in the visual cortex cadenced by the presen-
tation of the letters (Figure 2A). The comparison Target versus
Distractor letters, aiming at isolating Task 2 processes, revealed
activity in the ventral visual cortex, which later propagated to the
posterior parietal and frontal cortices from 250 to 900 ms
(Figure 2D). We then used multivariate pattern analyses to inves-
tigate how these activations were affected by dual-task
interference.
Dual-Task Interference Differentially Affects Early and
Late Brain Responses
To uncover the dynamics of Task 1 brain networks, we trained a
series of MVPA classifiers to categorize trials as belonging either
to the Lag 9 condition (where the T1 task was performed in isola-
tion, long before T2 appeared) or to the Irrelevant sound condi-
tion (where the T1 task was not performed; see Experimental
Procedures). Similarly, Task 2 classifiers were trained to discrim-
inate trials as belonging either to the Lag 9 condition (where the
T2 task was performed long after T1) or to the Distractor letter
condition (where the T2 task was not performed). Training two
sets of classifiers, one for each task, allowed us to track the brain
responses underlying Task 1 and Task 2 independently of each
other. We trained at Lag 9 in order to ensure that classifiers
were trained in a condition where Task 1 and Task 2 were per-
formed in near isolation, without causing dual-task interference.
We then tested for generalization to the shorter lags in which
dual-task interference occurred. Since the only difference be-
tween the Lag 9 condition and the other lags is the temporal
delay between the two target stimuli, this procedure minimizes
the differences between the training and testing sets.
In order to sample the sensory, central, and response stages
for each task, we selected classifiers trained at five latencies
(t = 200, 300, 400, 500, and 600 ms). Each classifier trained at
time t was then tested on its ability to categorize the data from
other time points t’. The prediction performance decreased
as the difference between the training time and the testing time
(t-t’) increased (e.g., Figures 2C and 2D). The width of the gener-
alization timewindow reflects the periods duringwhich the differ-
ential brain activity is approximately stable. Each classifier is
specific to a certain pattern of brain activity and the prediction
performance over time reflects the time course of this pattern.
This time course can be characterized by measuring the peak
decoding amplitude, peak latency, onset, and offset in order to
examine the impact of experimental manipulations on these
variables.
In order to unravel the effect of dual-task interference on these
brainprocesses, classifierswere trainedatLag9and thenapplied
to Lags 1–4 as well as to trials in which T2 was undetected (here-
after called ‘‘unseen T2’’). Task 1 processing was mildly affected
by dual-task interference, as the time course of generalizationer can be tested on its ability to generalize to other time samples to reveal the
ong inter-target lag were also tested on their ability to generalize to short inter-
in processes could then be examined and compared to the predictions of the
uron 88, 1297–1307, December 16, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1299
Figure 2. Time-Resolved Decoding of Brain Responses during Dual Tasking
(A) Experimental design: subjects had to discriminate a sound and a target letter embedded in a series of distractors. Three regions of interest from the primary
visual, auditory, and motor cortices are depicted below, together with their time courses (for the motor cortex, activation in the hemispheres ipsi- and contra-
lateral to the response handwere subtracted). Dotted black lines represent the rapid serial visual presentations (RSVPs), the sound (T1), and the relevant letter (T2,
at Lag 9) onsets. The blue and red dotted lines represent themean response time for Task 1 and Task 2, respectively. Note that the time courses are time locked to
the relevant events (from top to bottom: the sound onset, the RSVP onset, and the response to Task 1).
(legend continued on next page)
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performance did not vary with lag (Figure 2C). We only found that
the time course of the classifier trained at 600 ms had a slightly
shorter offset when the tasks overlapped, but this effect was
not significant (X2(3) = 5.9, PFDR = 0.20). By contrast, Task 2 pro-
cessing was heavily impacted by the inter-target lag and that this
effect varied according to the processing stage (Figure 2D). The
time courses of the classifiers trained at 200 and 300 ms were
not altered by the inter-target lag. At 400ms, the peak of the pre-
diction performance decreased in amplitude (X2(3) = 18.36,
PFDR < 0.001) and its latency was delayed when the inter-target
lag decreased (X2(3) = 12, PFDR = 0.03). The onset and offset
were also delayed (X2(3) = 13.85, PFDR = 0.02 and X
2(3) = 24.09,
PFDR < 0.01, respectively). Similar effects were observed for clas-
sifiers trained at 500ms (peak latency, X2(3) = 17.48, PFDR < 0.01;
onset, X2(3) = 15.12, PFDR = 0.01; offset, X
2(3) = 10.2, PFDR = 0.06,
amplitude, X2(3) = 24.12, PFDR < 0.001) and 600ms (peak latency,
X2(3)=15.72,PFDR<0.01;onset,X
2(3) =23.4,PFDR=0.001;offset,
X2(3) = 16.58, PFDR = 0.01, amplitude, X
2(3) = 16.44, PFDR < 0.01).
These results show that, at short inter-target lag, late Task
2-related processes were delayed during dual-task interference,
while early processes were left unaffected. Examining Task 1
processing at the same stage did not reveal any evidence of pro-
longed processes. This finding goes against the resource-
sharing model, which predicts that at some stage both tasks
should be prolonged because of shared limited resources.
Contrarily, these results suggest that resources were serially
allocated, first to Task 1, then to Task 2.
The above analyses are limited to a set of classifiers that were
defined a priori. Our next analysis considers the entire sets of un-
folding activations. When applied iteratively to every time sam-
ple, the decoding analysis results in a matrix of temporal gener-
alization (King and Dehaene, 2014). This approach is not
restrained to a priori defined spatio-temporal regions of interest
and provides a synthetic view of the dynamic of each processing
stage.
Dual-Task Interference Shortens Task 1 Processes
Figure 3 shows that Task 1 decoding performance sharply
increased 100 ms after stimulus onset (AUC close to 0.8)
and remained strong until the end of the epoch. The diagonal-
shaped decoding performance in Lag 9 shows that each classi-
fier generalized over a period of time of 200 ms, suggesting
that task processing consisted in a cascade of partially overlap-
ping processes. A first striking aspect of Figure 3A is that the
temporal generalization of Task 1 classifiers was altered at short
lags. The time courses of those classifiers exhibited shorter off-
sets (and therefore shorter durations) in Lags 1, 2, and 4
compared to Lag 9 (Figures 3A and 3B). At Lag 1, the offset
was shortened by 36 ms for a classifier at 516 ms and by
176 ms for a classifier at 736 ms (as compared to Lag 9 offsets).
A significant effect of inter-target lag was observed on the off-(B) Mean (±SEM) subjects’ response times (top) and accuracy (bottom) as a fun
performance, only trials with accurate Task 1 responses are presented.
(C) Left: sequence of brain activations (0–900ms) related to Task 1 after subtractio
scores compared to baseline) and in the sensors space (magnetometers). Right: te
after T1 onset) in each Lag condition (darker color for shorter Lags). Unseen trials
(D) Same as (C) but for Task 2 after subtraction of the Distractor letter condition.
Nesets of classifiers later than 288 ms (all PFDR < 0.05). By contrast,
the onsets of these classifiers were left completely unaffected.
This suggests that, although the total processing time of Task
1 was not affected by dual-task interference, the durations of
the successive brain responses were shortened. Our interpreta-
tion is that once a brain area (or a set of areas) transmits informa-
tion to the next one in the chain of processes, it is not abruptly
shut down but instead remains partially active, with a temporally
decaying profile, for a certain period of time. Our data indicate
that this late activation period is shortened by the presence of
Task 2. These results are in contradiction with the resource-
sharing model, which predicted that those stages would be
lengthened.
The processing of Task 1 on unseen T2 trials provides further
evidence. The comparison of Task 1 processes on Lag 9 and on
Lag 1 unseen T2 trials revealed differences neither in the peak
amplitude (all PFDR > 0.48), nor in the latency (all PFDR > 0.19), on-
sets (all PFDR > 0.4), and offsets (all PFDR > 0.7). Thus, while Task
1 processes were shortened on seen T2 trials, they unfolded nor-
mally on unseen T2 trials, as if T2 had not been presented (Fig-
ure 3A). Resource sharing implies that missing T2 should leave
all resources available to T1 and therefore speed up its process-
ing. Instead, the present results suggest that when T2 is unseen,
processing of Task 1 can proceed normally without being short-
ened (see Supplemental Information for a detailed description of
unseen T2 trials). Interestingly, these findings also present a
challenge for the bottleneck model, since they show that Task
1 processing is not immune to dual-task interference.
An alternative interpretation of Task 1 shortening could how-
ever be a different type of causal relation between the two suc-
cessive tasks: trials in which Task 1 duration is longer are more
likely to lead to an unseen T2 (Jolicoeur, 1998; Marti et al.,
2012; Sergent et al., 2005). In such a case, analyzing only the
‘‘seen’’ trials would lead to an apparent shortening of T1 pro-
cessing—an effect that would become increasingly larger at
shorter lags. While such an effect may contribute to our findings,
further analyses suggest that it cannot fully account for the re-
sults. First, RT1 in seen T2 trials was similar in all lag conditions
(p > 0.25). Second, although weaker, the shortening of T1-offset
continued to be observed at Lag 1 relative to Lag 9 when we
analyzed all trials, without sorting them into T2-seen and T2-un-
seen categories (Figure S1).
Another alternative interpretation would be that the shortening
of T1 decoding does not reflect changes in the dynamics of Task
1-related brain responses but instead reflects a change in task-
irrelevant background processes. Since the prediction perfor-
mance produced by a classifier depends on the signal-to-noise
ratio, any change in this prediction could reflect either changes in
the amplitude of the brain response or changes in the noise.
However, a classifier is highly selective of a certain pattern of
brain activity. In fact, any change in the signal measured onction of inter-target lag for Task 1 (blue) and Task 2 (red). Regarding Task 2
n of the irrelevant sound condition as shown in the source space (presented in Z
mporal generalization of Task 1-classifiers trained at five latencies (200–600ms
in Lag 1 are represented in black. In these panels, 0 ms represents T1 onset.
Time 0 represents T2 onset.
uron 88, 1297–1307, December 16, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1301
Figure 3. Temporal Generalization of Classifiers Reveals How Dual-Task Interference Impacts Task 1 and Task 2 Chains of Processes
(A) Temporal generalization matrices for Task 1 (top rows) and 2 (bottom rows) for each Lag condition and for unseen trials. In each panel, a classifier was trained
at each time sample (vertical axis: training time) and tested on all other time samples (horizontal axis: testing time). The dotted line corresponds to the diagonal of
the temporal generalization matrix, i.e., a classifier trained and tested on the same time sample. For each classifier, we measured the onset, the peak, the offset,
the duration, and the amplitude of the classification time course. Solid lines here represent the median peak latency, onset, and offset of each classifier.
(B) Colored lines indicate themedian difference between Lag 9 and the other lags (dark,medium, and light colors for Lag 1, 2, and 4, respectively). Taking the peak
latency as an example, a value of 0 on the y axis for a given condition means that the peak of the prediction performance had the same timing as in the Lag 9
condition. Negative and positive values indicate that the peak was shifted to earlier and later latency, respectively. Significant differences (signed-rank across
subjects, FDR corrected) between the Lag 9 condition and the other condition of interest are depicted with a thick line. For display purposes, data points were
smoothed using a moving average with a window of five samples.MEG sensors that are orthogonal to the classifier’s hyperplane
would by definition not affect prediction performance. Further-
more, it is unclear how irrelevant background activity could
induce a dynamical set of topographies highly similar to the
one evoked by task-relevant brain processes and affect the
evoked decoding performance (see Supplemental Information
for a detailed discussion).
Taken together, these results suggest that the shortening of
Task 1-related decoding time courses truly reflects a termination
of its corresponding processes.1302 Neuron 88, 1297–1307, December 16, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier IncDual-Task Interference Impairs and Delays Task 2
Processing
We next examined how Task 2 unfolded during dual-task inter-
ference. Between 200 and 350 ms after T2 presentation,
Task 2 could be successfully decoded. However, the temporal
generalization of each classifier remained weak, indicating that
during this period, target T2 passed through a series of short-
lived brain responses (Figure 3A). After 350 ms, the decoding
performance of Task 2 classifiers was observed over longer
time periods. The inter-target lag impacted only on the offset.
of classifiers trained from 344 ms onward (all PFDR < 0.05, Fig-
ure 3B). For instance, the prediction performance of the classifier
trained at 392 ms was prolonged by 166 ms in Lag 1 as
compared to Lag 9. The onsets and peak latencies were also
affected by dual-task interference from 396 and 400 ms onward,
respectively (all PFDR < 0.05). The direct comparison of Lag 1 and
Lag 9 conditions revealed that the peak performance of a classi-
fier observed at 400 ms in the Lag 9 condition was delayed by
214 ms in the Lag 1 condition, while its onset was delayed only
by 76 ms. The duration of this deflection, i.e., the difference be-
tween the onset and the offset, similarly increased by 80 ms,
although this effect did not reach significance. The delays
observed on the onsets progressively increased for later classi-
fiers (Figure 3B) and became comparable to the ones observed
on peak latency for classifiers >500 ms. For instance, a classifier
trained at 536ms revealed a time coursewith similar delays on its
onset and peak latency (152 ms and 148 ms, respectively).
Furthermore, the delay and prolongation decreased as the in-
ter-target lag increased. For instance, a classifier trained at
536 ms saw its peak being delayed by 97 ms in the Lag 2 condi-
tion as compared to the Lag 9 condition and by only 2 ms in the
Lag 4 condition. Finally, correlating the single-trial time courses
of each classifier with subjects’ reaction time revealed that
peak latencies, onsets, and offsets of late classifiers (>500 ms)
were positively correlated with RT2 at both Lag 9 and Lag 1.
Interestingly, the prediction performances of the same classifiers
were also positively correlated with RT1 but specifically at Lag 1
and not at Lag 9 (Figure S2).
Taken together, these findings indicate that between350 ms
and450 ms, Task 2 brain responses were not only delayed but
also prolonged in time. Beyond 500 ms, however, brain re-
sponses were mainly delayed. In fact, this delay could be
observed at the single-trial level and was directly related to a
delay in subjects’ motor response, suggesting serial processing.
Only Task 2 Is Impaired during Dual-Task Interference
According to the resource-sharing model, the allocation of
limited resources should not only prolong the execution of
both tasks, but it should also decrease the amplitude of their
brain activations. As the amplitude of neural responses directly
affects signal-to-noise ratio, this predicts that decoding perfor-
mance should decrease for both tasks. However, Task 1 decod-
ing performance was similar at all Lag conditions (all PFDR > 0.25
between 200 and 600 ms, overall AUC > 0.7, Figure 3B). We only
observed decreased performance for very late classifiers
(>664 ms, i.e., after the motor response to T1) at Lag 1 (all
PFDR < 0.05). By contrast, Task 2 decoding performance strongly
decreased in all short-lag conditions compared to the Lag 9 con-
dition. A significant drop in decoding performance was observed
for classifiers later than 348 ms (all PFDR < 0.05) and was partic-
ularly pronounced at the shortest lag (Figure 3B). Together, the
preservation of Task 1 decoding performance and the impair-
ment of Task 2 decoding performance suggest that cognitive
resources were not shared between tasks but were serially allo-
cated, first to Task 1 and subsequently to Task 2.
An alternative interpretation would be that the decreased Task
2 decoding performance is unrelated to the amplitude of the
brain response. Classifiers trained in a condition where the tasksNewere performed in isolation might not perform as well in a condi-
tion where multiple patterns of brain activity overlap. However,
two topographies can overlap in time without any impact on
the decoding performance of their corresponding classifiers if
they are generated from independent sources (Figures S4A
and S4B). We tested the selectivity of the classifiers used in
the present study and found that Task 1 classifiers were not
able to decode Task 2-related information and vice versa (Fig-
ures S4C and S4D). This suggests that the two sets of classifiers
were orthogonal to each other and that the decrease in Task 2
decoding performance was genuinely related to a decrease in
the amplitude of Task 2-related brain responses.
Taken together, the effects of dual-task interference on Task 1
and Task 2 processing depict a complex cognitive architecture
in which the execution of a task consists of a sequence of pro-
cesses partially overlapping in time. The design of the present
experiment does not allow for a complete separation of each
processing stage. However, the results revealed that these pro-
cesses have different dynamics. Figure 4 allows a direct compar-
ison of Task 1 and Task 2 processing dynamics and provides an
overview of dual-task interference: processes are first organized
in parallel and become serial only at a late stage (>500ms). How-
ever, those late Task 1 and Task 2 processes were not merely
performed one after the other but also repelled each other, a
property that was not predicted by existing models of dual
tasking.
DISCUSSION
The present study aimed at understanding the brain mecha-
nisms deployed to handle multiple tasks that overlap in time.
Specifically, we tested the respective predictions of the two
dominant models accounting for dual-task interference: serial
bottleneck versus resource sharing. The results revealed that
task processing is best understood as a chain of distinct proces-
sors. The chains of processes for Task 1 and 2 operated in par-
allel for several hundreds of milliseconds. Following this period,
Task 1 processes were shortened while Task 2 processes
were either hindered and prolonged or fully delayed. This sug-
gests a ‘‘collision’’ between chains of processes: Task 1 and
Task 2 late processes repelled each other. Those results strongly
argue against the resource-sharing model but also show that the
serial bottleneck model is incomplete. Consequently, we pro-
pose an alternativemodel of dual-task interference incorporating
parallel and serial processing, and in which Task 1 and Task 2
processes actually compete for attentional resources and
access to consciousness.
The Profiles of Task 1 and Task 2 Brain Responses
Disconfirm the Resource-Sharing Hypothesis
Our findings revealed that Task 2 processes located in the
ventral visual stream and in the posterior parietal cortex oper-
ated in parallel to Task 1 up to 350 ms after stimulus onset.
Between 350 and 450 ms, activations in the parietal cortex
increased and extended to the temporo-parietal area. Decoding
analyses revealed that these brain responses were observed in
parallel to Task 1 but were prolonged in time while their ampli-
tude decreased. This might correspond to a period in whichuron 88, 1297–1307, December 16, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1303
Figure 4. Direct Comparison of Task 1 and Task 2 Processing Dynamics during Dual-Task Interference
(A–D) Task collision in Lag 9 to 1. In each panel, the surface is delimited by the measured onset and offset of the prediction performance of each classifier (blue:
Task 1, red: Task 2). Colored dots indicate significant differences between the Lag 9 condition (peak latency, onset, and offset) and the condition of interest
(signed rank tests, FDR corrected). T1 is presented at time 0 and the corresponding diagonal is represented by a dashed line. Small black segments on this
diagonal indicate T1 onset on x and y axes. Task 2 is represented similarly except that T2 onset varies in each panel. On the right of each panel are represented the
time courses of classifiers (blue, Task 1; red, Task 2) trained at 300, 400, and 500 ms. The thick lines represent an AUC significantly different from chance level
(FDR corrected). The gray dotted lines indicate the training time of each classifier.limited resources are shared between tasks. However, Task 1
brain responses had shorter durations in Lags 1–4 compared
to Lag 9 and this effect vanished when T2 was not consciously
perceived. This finding contradicts the predictions of the
resource-sharing model. Even if the totality of resources was
successively allocated to each task, therefore emulating a serial
bottleneck (Tombu and Jolicoeur, 2003), the model would not
explain the fact that Task 1 processes were selectively short-
ened by the presence of Task 2. Therefore, these results suggest
a competition between Task 1 and 2 rather than a sharing of
limited resources.
Dual-Task Interference Cannot Be Fully Explained by a
Serial Bottleneck
These results also challenge the classical serial bottleneck hy-
pothesis, which typically proposes that Task 1 monopolizes
attentional resources and therefore should not be affected by
Task 2. The present results show instead that Task 1 is not im-
mune to dual-task interference and that Task 2 can actually
infringe on Task 1 processing.
Although these results are not compatible with the typical view
of a bottleneck, we found that Task 2 processes beyond
450 ms exhibited a clear serial profile: Task 1 and Task 2 brain
activations were observed one after the other and barely over-
lapped. This is consistent with previous studies that showed1304 Neuron 88, 1297–1307, December 16, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Incthat the lack of resources during Task 2 processing postponed
late brain activity (i.e., the P3 component of the ERPs) (Dell’ac-
qua et al., 2005; Sergent et al., 2005; Vogel et al., 1998). How-
ever, these studies were limited to the specific ERP components
that they focused on, based on a priori knowledge of their latency
and topography. The complete decomposition of tasks process-
ing provided here reveals that Task 1 processes were shortened,
while Task 2 processes were first diffused and then delayed (Vul
et al., 2008). This suggests that the late processes of Task 1 and
Task 2 repelled each other during dual-task interference. There-
fore, the typical view of the serial bottleneck may have to be
rethought in order to explain our findings.
Reconsidering the Brain’s Limitations to Multitasking
Our approach goes beyond the typical three-stage division of
sensory, central, and motor processing stages. Instead, the re-
sults revealed a series of distinct processes that could operate
in parallel to another task, rather than a single sensory stage.
Furthermore, contrary to the classic depiction of a single central
stage that would operate serially, we found evidence of multiple
central processes that each exhibited a serial mode of func-
tioning. Consequently, we propose a new theoretical framework
that incorporates both parallel and serial processes and explains
the present findings. We suggest that during the interference
period, Task 2 is not passively waiting for the completion of.
Task 1. Instead, it competes for cognitive resources—much like
two images compete for visibility during binocular rivalry. Specif-
ically, when two incoming targets compete for top-down
attentional signals from the posterior parietal cortex and the
temporo-parietal area, inhibitory interactions may shorten Task
1-related processes on the one hand, and weaken and hinder
the attentional engagement on Task 2 on the other hand (Dux
and Marois, 2009; Nieuwenstein et al., 2005). The task that re-
ceives the strongest attentional enhancement triggers activation
in parietal and frontal areas, allowing subjects to maintain and
access the stimulus consciously.
This model fits well with the global neuronal workspace theory
of consciousness (Dehaene et al., 1998; Sergent and Dehaene,
2004), which associates conscious perception to the synchro-
nized activation of a large fronto-parietal network that broad-
casts information in the cortex.Within this framework, our results
suggest that although Task 2 competes with Task 1, it is inhibited
during Task 1 processing, and the related sensory information is
temporarily stored in a decaying sensory buffer (Marti et al.,
2012; Sergent et al., 2005; Zylberberg et al., 2010). The atten-
tional engagement on Task 2 is weakened and its conscious rep-
resentation is delayed. Whether Task 2 will be consciously
perceived or not depends on a balance between the duration
of Task 1 processing and the degradation of Task 2 information
in the buffer (Marti et al., 2012). If Task 2-related sensory activity
is strong enough and Task 1 execution fast enough, then Task 2
can be accessed consciously although with a delay (Marti et al.,
2010). Otherwise, this stimulus remains unperceived (attentional
blink).
In conclusion, the decomposition of brain processes
described in the present study revealed a surprisingly subtle
functional architecture at play during multitasking. The architec-
ture, simultaneously involving parallel and serial chains of pro-
cesses, is a step toward a better comprehension of how the brain
deploys attention over a continuous flow of sensory information
and how this impacts the conscious representation of a stimulus.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects
The MEG recordings of ten participants previously analyzed in Marti et al.
(2012) were included in the present analyses. The study was approved by
the ‘‘Comite´ de Protection des Personnes’’ and all participants gave informed
and written consents before testing and received a compensation of 120V for
their participation.
Experimental Protocol
Subjects performed a dual-task experiment composed of an auditory discrim-
ination task (Task 1) and a visual discrimination task (Task 2) (Figure 2A). Sub-
jects first had to discriminate a sound with a high (1,100 Hz) or a low (1,000 Hz)
pitch presented for 84 ms. The second Task was to identify a black letter (Y or
Z, 0.64) embedded in a visual stream of 12 random black letters (duration:
34 ms separated by blank interval of 66 ms) presented on a white background
(‘‘Rapid Visual Stream Presentation’’ [RSVP]). The sound was presented
together with the third item of the stream and separated from the target letter
by 1, 2, 4, or 9 letters (‘‘Lags 1, 2, 4, and 9,’’ respectively). In addition, a con-
dition in which T2 was replaced by a ‘‘distractor letter’’ was also included. In
a separate block, participants performed a control condition in which they per-
formed the visual task but were instructed to ignore the sound (‘‘Irrelevant
sound’’ condition). Subjects were instructed to respond as fast as possible first
to the sound, then to the letter. Subjects were also informed that sometimesNethe target letter would be absent, in which case they should not give any
response. Trials in which T2 was presented but the participant failed to detect
it were classified as ‘‘unseen.’’
Trials started with the word ‘‘GO’’ (500 ms), followed by a fixation cross
(1,000 ms). The rapid visual stream then started. Following the RSVP, a blank
screen was presented for 3,000 ms before the beginning of the next trial. The
experiment consisted of two training blocks (20 trials each) followed by five
experimental blocks. In four blocks (100 trials each), subjects performed
both Task 1 and 2, resulting in 80 trials by inter-target Lag condition, and in
one block (50 trials) subjects performed only the visual task (i.e., irrelevant
sound condition). The order of the blocks was counterbalanced between sub-
jects. Subjects’ responses to Tasks 1 and 2, provided with their left and right
middle and index fingers were counterbalanced across subjects (6/10 using
left hand to respond to sounds).
MEG Recordings and Preprocessing
Subjects’ brain activity was recorded with a 306-channel whole-head
magneto-encephalography system (Elekta Neuromag, 102 magnetometers
and 102 pairs of orthogonal planar gradiometers) while performing a dual-
task protocol. Head position wasmeasured before each block with an isotrack
polhemus system to compensate for head movements between blocks. Elec-
tro-oculogram and electro-cardiogram were continuously recorded during the
experiment for offline rejection of eye movements and cardiac artifacts. Sam-
pling rate was set to 1,000 Hz with an analog band-pass filter from 0.1 to
330 Hz. MaxFilter Software (Elekta Neuromag) was used to compensate for
head movements, to interpolate bad channels, and to perform a signal space
separation (Taulu et al., 2004) so as to minimize the magnetic interference
external to the MEG helmet. The Fieldtrip package (Oostenveld et al., 2011)
(http://fieldtrip.fcdonders.nl/) was used with MATLAB 7.11 for epoching, trial
rejection, and baseline correction. Independent component analyses were
applied separately to each type of sensor. To identify the components related
to the cardiac artifact and to the eye movements, we computed correlations
between each component and the ECG and between each component and
the EOG and visually inspected their topography. Once identified, these com-
ponents were subtracted out from the raw data. Signals were low-pass filtered
below 30 Hz and down-sampled to 250 Hz.
Source Localizations
For each subject, an anatomical MRI (3T Siemens MRI scanner with a resolu-
tion of 1 3 1 3 1.1 mm) was acquired after the MEG acquisition. Subjects’
head was digitized and tracked within the MEG helmet in order to co-register
MEG signals with subjects’ anatomy. Gray and white matters were then
segmented with BrainVISA/Anatomist software tools (Geffroy et al., 2011)
(http://brainvisa.info). Subjects’ head and cortical surfaces were recon-
structed with the Brainstorm software (Tadel et al., 2011) (http://neuroimage.
usc.edu/brainstorm/). Models of the cortex and the head were used to esti-
mate the current-source density distribution over the cortical surface. The for-
ward modeling was computed using overlapping spheres analytical model.
Weighted minimum norm estimate (wMNE) was used for inverse modeling
(depth-weighting factor: 0.5; dipole orientation constrained to be normal to
the cortex).
In order to perform group analyses, we projected individual source estimate
data on the standard MNI anatomical template. The contrasts between the
conditions of interest were then computed. MEG signals are presented in Z
scores relative to baseline and spatially smoothed over five neighboring
vertices. Regions of interest (see Figure 2A) were visually defined a priori in
the left and right primary auditory cortex (144 vertices), the primary visual cor-
tex (276 vertices), and the primary motor cortex (208 vertices) with Brainstorm.
Multivariate Pattern Analyses
Time-Resolved MVPA
When comparing two experimental conditions, the difference in brain activa-
tions results in a series of specific topographical patterns at the sensor level.
When applying MVPA to MEG or EEG data, it is possible to train a classifier
at each time sample within each subject to isolate the topographical patterns
that best differentiate the two conditions. In the present study, MVPA
were applied using Scikit-Learn (Pedregosa et al., 2011). A 5-fold stratifieduron 88, 1297–1307, December 16, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1305
cross-validation procedure was used for within-subjects analyses. For a given
time sample, the MEG data were randomly split into 5 folds of trials and
normalized (Z score of each channel-time feature within the cross-validation).
The same proportion of each class was kept within each fold (stratification). A
linear support vector machine (SVM [Chang and Lin, 2001]) was trained with a
penalty parameter C fixed to 1 on 4 folds and tested on the left out trials in order
to find the hyperplane (in this case a topography) that best separated the two
classes without overfitting. A weighting procedure was applied in order to
equalize the contribution of each class to the definition of the hyperplane.
This procedure was iteratively applied for each time sample of each fold.
Generalization across Time
Classifiers trained at each time sample were also tested on their ability to
discriminate conditions at all other time samples. The complete ‘‘temporal
generalization’’ (King and Dehaene, 2014; King et al., 2014) results in a ma-
trix of training time 3 testing time. The diagonal of this matrix corresponds
to classifiers trained and tested on the same time sample. Training one
classifier at time t and generalizing it time t’ was performed within the
cross-validation so that t and t’ data came from independent sets of trials.




In order to track Task 1-related and Task 2-related brain responses indepen-
dently of each other, a series of MVPA classifiers were trained to categorize tri-
als belonging either to the Lag 9 condition (where Task 1was performed in near
isolation) or to the Irrelevant sound condition (where Task 1 was not per-
formed). Following the same logic, another series of classifiers were trained
to discriminate trials belonging either to the Lag 9 condition (where Task 2
was performed in near isolation) or to the Distractor letter condition (where
Task 2 was not performed). To evaluate how these brain responses were
affected by the inter-target lag, we then applied the same classifiers to Lags
1–4 trials as well as to unseen T2 trials.
Statistical Analyses
For each test trial, classifiers generated a probabilistic output (Platt, 1999) to
provide a continuous estimate comparable across subjects. Non-parametric
effect sizes are reported with an area-under-the-curve (AUC) computed
from the receiver operative curves (ROC), and representing predictions of
true positives (e.g., a trial was correctly predicted to belong to Lag 9 condition)
and predictions of false positives (e.g., a trial was incorrectly predicted to
belong to Lag 9 condition). An AUC of 0.5 corresponds to chance level as it
means that true positive and false positive are equiprobable. Conversely an
AUC of 1 means a perfect prediction of a given class. AUC below 0.5 can oc-
casionally be observed when classifiers are generalized across time or condi-
tion. This means that the probability of false positives is higher than the prob-
ability of true positives. In the context of M/EEG recordings, this can be
explained by a reversal of the polarity of a given topographical pattern between
the training time and the testing time (King et al., 2014).
Statistical analyseswereperformedacrosssubjects,overa temporalwindow
starting 200 ms before stimulus onset (either T1 or T2) and ending 1,100 ms
after. We used signed rank tests with a threshold set at alpha = 0.05 to assess
whether classifiers could predict the trials’ classes above the chance level (0.5).
A correction for multiple comparisons was then applied with a false discovery
rate (FDR).
Peak Measurement
For each subject, wemeasured the amplitude, the peak latency, the onset, and
the offset of each classification time course. Data were first low-pass filtered at
10 Hz and the analyses were restrained to a 200–1,000 ms time window in
which decoding performance was high in all experimental conditions. To mea-
sure the amplitude and the latency of the peak, we considered all time points
for which the decoding performance exceeded the 95th percentile of the distri-
bution. The median of these time points was considered as the peak latency
and the median AUC as the peak amplitude. Although these estimators are
not unbiased, themethod allowed us to avoid numerical instabilities. The onset
was defined by stepping backward from the peak and identifying the time point
at which the AUC exceeded a threshold percentage of the peak. The choice of
the threshold being arbitrary, we tried several values: 10%, 30%, and 50% of1306 Neuron 88, 1297–1307, December 16, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Incthe difference between the mean AUC during the baseline period (from
200ms to stimulus onset) and the peak amplitude. As the results were similar
across values, we then kept the threshold to 50%. Similarly, the offset of the
prediction performance was defined as the first time sample following the
peak whose AUC was inferior to the threshold. In sum, this analysis resulted
in four values (peak latency, onset, offset, and amplitude) for each training
time that could be compared between conditions.
Statistical Analyses
The effect of the inter-target lag on these variables was evaluated at each time
sample (across subjects) with Friedman tests. A correction for multiple com-
parisons (FDR) was then applied over time. We also directly compared peak
measurements obtained from each short lag condition (1, 2, and 4) to the
Lag 9 condition (see Figure 3B) with signed rank tests with FDR correction
applied over time.
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